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ZONING ORDINANCES AFFECTING CHURCHES:
A PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDED FREE EXERCISE
PROTECTION
In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v.
City of Lakewood,' a case of first impression in the federal courts, the
Sixth Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
that excludes church buildings from residential districts. The plaintiff
congregation claimed that the exclusion violated its members' first
amendment right to the free exercise of their religion.' Applying a free
exercise analysis it believed to be mandated by Supreme Court prece-
dent, the Sixth Circuit held that because the zoning ordinance did not
clash with a fundamental tenet of the plaintiff's religion, the ordinance
did not implicate the plaintiff's free exercise rights.' The court there-
fore did not require the defendant municipality to show that the zoning
ordinance' furthered a compelling state interest-the stringent standard
normally applied by the Supreme Court in cases involving burdens on
religious freedom." Instead, the Sixth Circuit demanded only that the
ordinance comport with due process: it tested the zoning restriction
against a deferential minimal rationality standard5 and concluded that
the ordinance was constitutional.
The Lakewood analysis was not dictated by Supreme Court prece-
dent." Instead, Lakewood may well reflect the confused state of current
free exercise analysis. The Supreme Court has never explicitly ad-
dressed a case in which a challenged law regulated religious activity not
directly tied to a fundamental religious tenet, but rather has assumed in
its free exercise decisions that the restricted practices at issue are funda-
1 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ... "). The free exercise
clause was held applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
3 699 F.2d at 306-08.
' For a statement of the free exercise standard, see infra note 62 and accompany-
ing text.
5 For a statement of the due process standard, see infra note 35.
6 See infra text accompanying note 83. The approach the Sixth Circuit adopted,
however, is commonly used by federal courts in assessing free exercise claims. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983).
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mental to the plaintiff's faith. The Supreme Court's habit of making
this assumption has led lower courts, including the Lakewood panel, to
turn the assumption into a requirement-that is, to condition the appli-
cation of free exercise analysis on a threshold determination that the
restricted activity is fundamental to the plaintiff's religion.
7
The Sixth Circuit's reading of the free exercise precedents ignores
the danger that the exercise of religion may be hampered by regulations
prohibiting religious groups from obtaining "desirable accessor[ies] of
worship."8 It also does not sufficiently recognize that the expressive and
communicative elements of religious observance can be as central to the
religious experience, and as deserving of protection, as doctrine.9
Rather, the Lakewood court's approach effectively excludes religiously
motivated activities not doctrinally mandated from the protection of the
free exercise clause and allows government to burden such activities
with regulations that are only minimally rational.
This Comment suggests that the problem presented by Lakewood
be resolved by broadening established free exercise analysis. It proposes
no alteration of the highly protective standard now applied in cases of
governmental infringement of doctrinally mandated religious activity. It
does urge, however, that existing free exercise analysis be expanded to
protect religiously motivated activity, such as a congregation's decision
to locate a church in a given area, that may currently remain unpro-
tected. Part I analyzes current court approaches to church zoning ordi-
nances. It begins with a consideration of Lakewood and goes on to sur-
vey decisions from the state courts, the forums in which most of the
zoning cases have been litigated. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's
articulation of a free exercise standard, and concludes that the Court
has not established guidelines for the determination of how much pro-
tection must be given to religiously motivated, but nonmandatory, activ-
ity. Part III argues that the communicative and expressive aspects of
religiously motivated activity justify the application of the least restric-
tive alternative analysis employed by the Court in first amendment
cases involving time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. Such an
approach, the Comment concludes, affords needed protection to relig-
iously motivated activity, yet leaves courts the flexibility to uphold legit-
imate governmental action.
7 See Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 305, 308.
8 Id. at 307.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 84-101.
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I. COURTS' TREATMENT OF ZONING ORDINANCES
AFFECTING RELIGION
A. Lakewood
Lakewood, Ohio is a Cleveland suburb composed primarily of
one- and two-family residences. Its commercial district lines two major
east-west arteries of the city. Kingdom Hall, the church building of the
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, is currently situated in a
storefront on one of these arteries. Because it wanted to relocate King-
dom Hall to a more spacious site that was more conducive to worship,
the congregation purchased a lot in a residential area of Lakewood in
1972. Its proposed church building was designed to blend with the
large, stately homes in the neighborhood.10
In 1973, the city of Lakewood enacted a new zoning code under
which church buildings are permitted only in districts comprising ap-
proximately ten percent of the city's land. The congregation's lot is in a
district now zoned for single-family dwellings and "roomers." 11 When
in 1975 the congregation sought approval to construct a church on its
lot, the building commissioner denied a building permit because the
area was zoned exclusively for residential use. The congregation sued
the city, alleging that the zoning ordinance violated its members' right
freely to exercise their religion. 2 The district court upheld the
ordinance.1
In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v.
10 The new Kingdom Hall was to be a "low, square building with a rustic stone
exterior." The design aimed at preserving the trees on the land and sheltering the
parking lot from homes nearby. See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
72 (1983).
The congregation initially sought permission to build on the site in 1972. At that
time the area was zoned for residential use, but the board of zoning appeals had the
power to grant zoning exceptions. Before the congregation purchased its lot, the board
denied its application for an exception on the grounds that, inter alia, a church would
create traffic problems, increase noise levels, and potentially decrease property values.
Id. at 304-05. The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and the Court of Appeals
for Cuyahoga County affirmed the board's decision. See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 9 Ohio Op. 3d 314 (1978).
Il Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lake-
wood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
12 The congregation also argued that the ordinance violated its members' fifth and
fourteenth amendment rights, and sought damages for all violations under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Supp. V 1981). The district court rejected all three constitutional claims. See
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, No.
C80-1939 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 1981).
11 See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, No. C80-1939 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 1981).
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City of Lakewood,14 the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Its opinion consisted of
a two-part analysis. First, the court addressed "the principal question
presented in the appeal": 5 whether the zoning ordinance infringed the
congregation's free exercise rights. Because it read the Supreme Court's
free exercise precedents as protecting only conduct central to the con-
gregation's religion,"6 the court began its free exercise analysis by eval-
uating the nature of the religious observance at stake. It found that the
construction of a church in a residential district had no religious or
ritualistic significance. The building of a church, the court declared,
was a "purely secular act."' 17 "At the most," said the court, "the Con-
gregation can claim that its freedom to worship is tangentially related
to worshipping in its own structure."18 The court concluded that
"building and owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship, not
a fundamental tenet of the Congregation's religious beliefs."1 9
The court next proceeded to analyze the nature of the burden that
the zoning ordinance imposed on an activity the court had already de-
fined as tangential to the exercise of the congregation's religion. It
noted that the ordinance did not "prevent the Congregation from prac-
ticing its faith through worship whether the worship be in homes,
4 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983). On appeal, the
congregation argued only the first amendment claim. I'd. at 304.
16 Id. at 303.
16 See id. at 306.
17 Id. at 307.
15 Id.
1'9 Id. To clarify this characterization, the court pointed to the contrast between
the facts of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), cases in which the Supreme Court granted members of religious groups
exemptions from laws that infringed the practice of their religions, and the facts of
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), in which the Court refused to hold Sunday
closing laws unconstitutional as applied to Orthodox Jewish merchants. See Lakewood,
699 F.2d at 306.
In Sherbert, the appellant was forced to choose whether to violate the precepts of
her religion by working on Saturday or to suffer "severe, life-threatening economic
sanctions," Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 306, by foregoing state unemployment benefits.
Compulsory school attendance laws forced the respondents in Yoder, under threat of
criminal penalty, to violate fundamental tenets of their Amish religion. See Yoder, 406
U.S. at 210-11. In Braunfeld, on the other hand, the Supreme Court held tlhat Sunday
closing laws did not unconstitutionally infringe the religious freedom of Orthodox Jew-
ish merchants because such laws posed only an incidental economic burden and be-
cause the compelling state purpose of providing a uniform day of rest could be satisfac-
torily effected in no other way. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607-09.
The Lakewood court described the laws challenged in Sherbert and Yoder as creat-
ing insurmountable barriers to the believers' observance of essential practices of their
religions, whereas the Sunday closing laws in Braunfeld imposed no such insuperable
bar to religious observance. The Sixth Circuit found that, like the Sunday closing laws,
the Lakewood ordinance "'simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to the
appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expen-
sive.'" Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605).
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schools, other churches, or meeting halls throughout the city."2 The
ordinance imposed on the congregation only an indirect financial bur-
den and a subjective aesthetic burden, neither of which placed pressure
on the group to abandon its beliefs and observances.2" Because the ordi-
nance did not force the Jehovah's Witnesses to violate an essential re-
quirement of their faith, their free exercise rights had not been
implicated.22
Had the court found a free exercise infringement, it would have
required the city to justify it with a compelling governmental interest."
Having found no such infringement, however, the court proceeded to
the second part of its analysis, in which it subjected the ordinance to a
due process inquiry.24 It found that the city's stated interest in control-
ling traffic congestion was sufficient to qualify the ordinance as not
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare."125 Because it
passed this minimal test, the ordinance was upheld.
Under the Lakewood approach, therefore, not all burdens upon re-
ligious observance will trigger the highly protective free exercise analy-
sis. If a law interferes with an individual's belief or prohibits her from
fulfilling a fundamental obligation of her religion, it infringes freedom
of religion, and the government must present proof of a compelling gov-
20 Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307.
21 Id. The Lakewood court's two-part free exercise analysis (nature of the reli-
gious observance; nature of the burden on that religious observance) is not completely
logical. The court identified the observance as the construction of a church building in a
residential neighborhood. The Lakewood ordinance constitutes a total ban upon this
practice, rather than a financial and aesthetic burden. Presumably, the total prohibition
is permissible because the construction of a church is not a cardinal principle of the
Witnesses' faith. In describing the nature of the burden as financial and aesthetic, the
court was describing the burden placed upon the congregation's religious practices as a
whole, rather than upon the particular religious observance in question.
22 It was for this reason that the Sixth Circuit found Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981), inapplicable to the due process analysis. See Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 308-09. In
Moore, the Supreme Court invalidated a restrictive definition of "family" in a zoning
ordinance on the ground that it interfered with the right to privacy in family relation-
ships, a fundamental value protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. In Schad, the Court found that an ordinance
excluding live entertainment from a municipality violated the first amendment. See
Schad, 452 U.S. at 65. Both Moore and Schad thus involved infringements of constitu-
tionally protected privacy and speech rights and required a stringent standard of consti-
tutional review. Because the Lakewood court held that there was no first amendment
infringement, by contrast, it required no more than minimal justification to approve the
challenged ordinance.
23 See id. at 305.
24 The court relied for its due process test upon the landmark zoning case of Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
25 Id. at 395, quoted in Lakewood, 399 F.2d at 308.
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ernmental interest or the law will fail. If, however, the law prohibits or
burdens an activity that is only tangentially or remotely related to the
central tenets of the faith, there is no free exercise infringement
whatsoever.
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the Lakewood ordinance did
not affect religious freedom is overly simplistic. Lakewood's fundamen-
tal tenet analysis ignores the importance of nonmandatory religious ac-
tivities to members of the church, as well as the fact that religious ritual
is a mode of expression.2" Certainly, restrictions on the location in
which services may be held impose some burden on religious activity.
Given the importance that our constitutional scheme attaches to the
protection of religious exercise, a court's analysis of government acts
that burden religiously motivated activity should require that the gov-
ernment answer to a higher standard than minimal rationality. In the
majority of church zoning cases in which state courts have faced the
problem of exclusion of churches from residential districts, the analyses
have reflected an explicit or implicit recognition of the burden that such
ordinances may place upon religious observance.
B. The State Cases: The Due Process Alternative
For the most part, the state courts, which have heretofore consid-
ered the vast majority of church zoning cases, have not explicitly con-
sidered the free exercise problems involved."7 Rather, they have applied
26 See infra text accompanying notes 84-101.
27 A few state courts, however-notably the New York courts-have found such
measures violative of the free exercise clause after explicitly balancing state interests in
regulation against religious interests. See, e.g., Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of
the North Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 288,
379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753, 342 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1975) ("[T]he peculiarly pre-eminent
status of religious institutions under the First Amendment provision for free exercise of
religion remains an important factor entering into the balance that also weighs the
needs or desires of the community."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). Thus, with
respect to religious structures, "the permissible extent of governmental regulation in the
name of the police power[]" is "severely curtail[ed]" so that "considerations which may
wholly justify the exclusion of commercial structures from residential areas are inade-
quate to the task when religious structures are involved." Westchester Reform Temple
v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 496, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 303, 239 N.E.2d 891, 896 (1968).
In a recent case, a New York court held that although a zoning board's reasons for
excluding a religious structure would have been valid if offered in reference to another
type of building, those reasons were inadequate to support the exclusion of a building
used for religious purposes. Islamic Soe'y of Westchester and Rockland, Inc. v. Foley,
96 A.D.2d 536, 537, 464 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (1983) (under New York law, not only
must municipalities apply zoning ordinances in a more flexible manner to religious
-institutions, but zoning boards have an affirmative duty to suggest to religious groups
ways to comply with legitimate zoning requirements).
Other state courts have allowed the free exercise issue directly to influence the due
process analysis. Several have cited infringement of the free exercise of religion as a
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a due process analysis to test the constitutionality of zoning ordi-
nances.28 These cases do reflect an appreciation of the burdens that
zoning ordinances place upon religious activity. But the courts have
demonstrated this appreciation in an unprincipled manner by simply
heightening the level of due process scrutiny on a case-by-case basis to
reflect the religious interests involved. The resulting ad hoc balancing
analysis often has the desirable effect of shielding religiously motivated
activity. For example, the majority of state courts have declared that a
zoning ordinance may not exclude places of worship from residential
districts. 9 The ad hoc nature of the heightened due process inquiry,
however, means that it can be applied, as in fact it is applied by a
minority of state courts, to reach the conclusion that such exclusions are
rational and therefore constitutional."0 The due process balancing anal-
ysis, the flexibility of which enables some courts to extend greater pro-
tection to religiously motivated activity, thus ultimately provides too un-
steady a reed upon which to rely for the protection of such activity.
1. The Majority Approach
Church zoning cases typically come to state courts after a zoning
board has refused to grant a permit for religious use in a district zoned
reason to hold ordinances unreasonable and arbitrary. The willingness of these courts
to invalidate ordinances that exclude churches from residential districts stems from def-
erence toward religion. The Supreme Court of Ohio has reasoned thus:
How does the case stand with respect to the protection of public
morals and the general welfare? The church in our American society has
traditionally occupied the role of both teacher and guardian of morals.
Restrictions against churches could therefore scarcely be predicated upon a
purpose to protect public morals . . . . Fully to accomplish its great reli-
gious and social function, the church should be integrated into the home
life of the community which it serves.
State ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229,
248-49, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942). As the Illinois Appellate Court stated, "Obviously,
the courts feel that wherever the souls of men are found, there the house of God be-
longs." O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 2d 45, 51, 105 N.E.2d 917, 920
(1952).
s See, e.g., City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362
P.2d 172 (1961) (blanket restriction on churches not reasonably necessary to further
state interests in health, safety, and general welfare of the community); Mooney v.
Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952) (restriction on use of
property for church purposes not a reasonable exercise of state police power).
"9 See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). For collections of cases and compari-
sons of state courts' approaches, see 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§
12.19-.20 (2d ed. 1976); 3 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 28-14 (3d ed.
1967).
SO See infra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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for residences,"' has refused to grant a variance to general zoning re-
quirements, 2 or has interpreted the provisions of a zoning ordinance so
as to exclude a church. 3 Most state courts have invalidated the exclu-
sion of churches by finding, under the due process clause, that such
exclusions are arbitrary and unreasonable and bear no relation to pub-
lic health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 4
The way in which state court opinions have analyzed these cases
demonstrates that religious interests form part of the due process
calculus. In determining whether a zoning regulation is reasonable, a
court asks whether the excluded use is incompatible with permitted
uses.3 5 In some cases, the exclusion of churches from a particular
neighborhood is indisputably arbitrary under this standard. 6 In other
cases, however, courts refuse to accept government justifications for
such exclusions that do not, on their face, appear to be arbitrary.37 In
11 See, e.g., Church of Christ v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Ind.
App. 346, 371 N.E.2d 1331 (1978).
2 These general zoning provisions often take the form of setback requirements,
which may in fact impose an insurmountable barrier to the church's locating in the
neighborhood. See, e.g., Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore, Inc. v.
Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 342 N.E.2d
534 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
33See, e.g., Rogers v. Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S.E.2d 668
(1964).
See, e.g., City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362
P.2d 172 (1961).
3' The applicable standard was set forth by the Supreme Court in Village of Eu-
did v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (citations omitted):
Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question
whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an
abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but
by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the local-
ity. . . . If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes
be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.
S" See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945), in which
churches were excluded from a district where permissible uses included schools, col-
leges, public libraries, public museums and art galleries, parks, swimming pools (mu-
nicipal or private), farms, and greenhouses. The exclusion was struck down as "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. at 202, 156 P.2d at 244.
87 See, e.g., Rogers v. Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 118-19, 137 S.E.2d
668, 672 (1964), in which, in answer to the government's contention that a church
would increase traffic, the court emphasized the small size of the church and the fact
that religious services would be held only a few times a week. Because even a small
church increases traffic in a neighborhood, this argument seems to place on the govern-
ment a greater burden than proof of rationality. One court has even made the sweeping
statement that "it is rarely, if ever, that people entering or leaving a church cause or
contribute to traffic accidents." Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 92, 117 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1954) (footnote omit-
ted). Such an attitude places churches in a special category with regard to the legitimate
government purpose of controlling traffic. Moreover, although the effect of a church on
[Vol. 132:1131
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many cases, moreover, state courts place an extra requirement on the
government by transferring the burden of justifying the regulation to
the defendant municipality."' In the latter group of cases, the underly-
ing principle seems to be that because of the importance of religious
freedom, such laws are unreasonable. In these cases one sees most
clearly the concern for religious freedom that lies behind the articulated
due process analysis.
The preferential treatment that may be accorded to churches is
illustrated by the New York Court of Appeals's treatment of an argu-
ment that construction of churches in residential districts would ad-
versely affect property values. In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Board of Brighton,3 9 the court stated that "in view of the high pur-
poses, and the moral value, of these institutions, mere pecuniary loss to
a few persons should not bar their erection and use."4 After reviewing
other asserted reasons for exclusion, the court held that the zoning
board's decisions "bear no substantial relation to the promotion of the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community; they
must therefore be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable and should be
annulled."' 1
Even those courts that have stated emphatically that a church may
not be absolutely excluded by zoning restrictions have not gone so far as
to claim that all zoning ordinances affecting churches are impermissi-
ble. Instead, these courts balance the interest of the plaintiff churches
against the government interest in the zoning regulations. Thus the
court in Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Indiana Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses"2 invalidated a parking requirement that would
have effectively excluded a church, but upheld a setback requirement
with which the church could have reasonably complied. The court
stated that the state's interest in traffic control, which was the basis for
the parking regulation, did not outweigh the church's interest to the
property values, tax revenues, and noise levels might seem to be reasonable grounds for
holding religious use of land incompatible with residential use, some courts have found
exclusions based on these considerations to be arbitrary and unreasonable. See, e.g.,
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849,
136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
11 See Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1428, 1431 (1957) (criti-
cizing this allocation of the burden of proof in the context of due process analysis).
39 1 N.Y.2d 508, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
40 Id. at 524, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861, 136 N.E.2d at 835.
41 Id. at 526, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863, 136 N.E.2d at 837 (emphasis omitted). In its
opinion, the court also stated that "churches and schools occupy a different status from
mere commercial enterprises and, when the church enters the picture, different consid-
erations apply." Id. at 523, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 859, 136 N.E.2d at 834.
42 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
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extent necessary to justify the exclusion of a church.43 Other courts
have indicated, however, that in particular cases the state's interest
might be sufficient to permit the exclusion of a church."" The determi-
nation whether there is a reasonable necessity for denying a permit for
a church is governed by the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.
4 5
Thus, although state courts have sometimes spoken in uncondi-
tional terms, 46 they have in fact been willing to balance the infringe-
ment of a church's freedom against the community's interest in preserv-
ing the integrity of a residential neighborhood. The state courts'
heightened due process scrutiny has enabled them to do this ad hoc
balancing and in many instances to reach sounder results than would
either the compelling interest free exercise test or minimal due process
analysis.
2. The Minority Approach and the Limits
of Due Process Analysis
Not all state courts have adopted the theory that exclusion of
churches from residential districts is impermissible. The problems in-
herent in relying on a due process analysis to provide consistent protec-
tion for religiously motivated activity are illustrated by the decisions of
these minority-view courts. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 
7
California set a precedent for the minority view." Porterville held that
43 Id. at 92-94, 117 N.E.2d at 120.
"' See, e.g., Congregation Comm., North Fort Worth Congregation, Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added):
Refusal of a permit to erect a church in a residential district, there
being no adequate showing that the exclusion of the church was in further-
ance of public health, safety, morals or the public welfare, is arbitrary and
unreasonable....
Since a city cannot legally exclude a church from a residential district
by a zoning ordinance, it cannot legally accomplish the same result by
denying permits unless the reasons for refusing the pernits are based on
valid evidence showing that to permit a church would be detrimental to
the health, the safety, the morals or the general welfare of the community.
The Fort Worth court found blanket exclusions of churches to be arbitrary, but did not
believe churches should be accorded absolute protection if the circumstances of a partic-
ular case justified exclusion. Id. at 704-05.
48 See id. at 705.
'6 See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115.
'v 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805
(1949).
41 See, e.g., City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 382,
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exclusion of churches from a residential district has a substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare and is
therefore a rational government measure. The California court accepted
the congestion and traffic control rationales that majority-view courts
have explicitly rejected as sufficiently important government interests to
support a blanket exclusion of churches."
9
Despite the contrary results they reach, majority and minority
courts have one common feature: neither is absolutist. Courts taking the
majority view will allow the building of churches to be regulated in the
interest of public health and general welfare,50 while minority-view
362 P.2d 172, 176 (1961); Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 391-
92, 53 N.W.2d 308, 309 (1952). Florida courts have also adhered to the minority view.
See Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami Beach,
82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
49 See Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 659, 203 P.2d 823, 825. ("It is a matter
of common knowledge that people in considerable numbers assemble in churches and
that parking and traffic problems exist where crowds gather."). The court noted that
"[a] single family residence may be much more desirable when not. . . adjacent to a
public building such as a church." Id. It is questionable, however, whether California
in fact gives municipalities absolute license to exclude churches from residential areas.
Porterville seems to have been decided on its facts. See 90 Cal. App. 2d at 660, 203
P.2d at 825 ("The petitioner is not a congregation, but holds his property as a corpora-
tion sole, the existence of which depends upon the laws of the state. Having such right
from the state, the enjoyment of the property is subject to reasonable regulations.").
In Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), appeal
dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959), the court, relying upon Porterville, found that the
religious group had not proved that the challenged ordinance had the effect of excluding
churches from 90% of the city. The court implied that proof of such exclusion might
lead to the conclusion that the ordinance created a practical hardship, thus justifying
the grant of a variance. Id. at 27, 37, 330 P.2d at 263, 269. Moreover, the Minney
court explicitly recognized that the case involved free exercise considerations. Id. at 21,
330 P.2d at 259 ("The Porterville case is but a recognition and application of the
concept that there can be no absolutes even in the field of personal freedoms . .. ."
(emphasis added)). The Minney court cited cases in which the United States Supreme
Court recognized that interference with free exercise or freedom of speech can be out-
weighed by public interest in regulation: Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). See Minney, 164 Cal. App. 2d at 22-23, 330 P.2d at 260-61.
Thus California and other minority-view courts, despite their minimum rationality lan-
guage, in fact seem willing to accommodate religious interests in zoning cases.
A recent New Jersey case further illustrates the flexibility in minority-view analy-
sis. Although the court adopted the minority view that churches may be excluded en-
tirely from a residential district, it analyzed the issue explicitly in terms of the permissi-
ble restrictions on free exercise rights. See State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445
A.2d 75 (1982), affd, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983). The court
found, however, that the restriction did not directly infringe free exercise rights since
"it merely limit[ed] the secular interest of a Congregation to establish a place of wor-
ship at a location of its own choosing." Id. at 81, 445 A.2d at 83. The court was able to
justify this restriction on the strength of the state's interest in controlling noise and
traffic in residential areas zoned for single-family homes. Id. at 75-76, 445 A.2d at 80.
50 See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals, 223 Ind. App. 83, 89-90, 117 N.E.2d 115,
118 (setback requirements valid).
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courts have not stated that a municipality may exclude churches from
residential districts in all circumstances.51 Thus, while minority-view
courts may give different weights to the competing interests from most
state courts, all seem to have adopted some form of case-by-case balanc-
ing approach for church zoning cases.
The state courts' due process approach is not the best solution.
Masking the free exercise issues in the language of due process analysis
obscures the courts' reasoning and leads, as the majority and minority
cases demonstrate, to inconsistent and unpredictable results. Failure to
articulate the solicitude for religious liberty that lies behind the deci-
sions precludes coherent explanation of the weights assigned to compet-
ing interests. Some state courts have thus treated religion with great
deference without confronting the establishment question raised by such
special treatment.52 On the other hand, even state courts taking the mi-
nority view have recognized that free exercise rights are involved in
municipal decisions to exclude churches from residential districts.5"
Formulaic reiteration of the "rule" has left the true bases of decision
unstated.
In fact, some state courts may have adopted the heightened due
process standard because the only apparent alternative analysis seemed
to require the government to meet an inappropriately high burden of
justification. These courts may have rejected free exercise analysis, with
its requirement of a compelling government interest to justify infringe-
ments, because it places too heavy a burden on municipalities when, as
in church zoning cases, the infringed observance does not rise to the
level of a cardinal principle of the faith. The use of a due process anal-
ysis that sub silentio requires more than a rational government interest
appears attractive because it allows courts to protect religious interests
but also to uphold some building restrictions that enhance the public
welfare more than they infringe religious observance.
The objectives of flexibility and accommodation of reasonable re-
ligiously motivated activities that state courts have sought to achieve by
applying a heightened due process analysis can be better achieved,
while avoiding the serious disadvantages inherent in such an approach,
by directly confronting the first amendment problems that church zon-
ing cases raise. A flexible approach, consistent with free exercise prece-
dents but sufficiently cognizant of a sphere of legitimate government
5" See, e.g., Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958),
appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
52 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
53 See, e.g., Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 21, 330 P.2d 255, 259
(1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
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regulation, may be found in existing strains of first amendment
analysis."
II. GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT:
THE FREE EXERCISE CASES
As an alternative to a due process approach, a court faced with a
church zoning question may choose an analysis that focuses directly
upon the burden imposed by a zoning ordinance on a churchgoer's abil-
ity freely to exercise her religion. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
has provided only ambiguous guidance for such an analysis.
The first major free exercise case to come before the Court was
Braunfield v. Brown.5 5 The Braunfeld Court rejected the claim that the
application of Sunday closing laws to Orthodox Jewish merchants
whose religious beliefs prohibited them from doing business on Satur-
day violated their free exercise rights.58 Justice Warren's plurality
opinion noted that Sunday closing laws imposed only an indirect bur-
den on the exercise of religion.5 ' Not all indirect burdens on free exer-
cise were permissible, the plurality said, but only those imposed when
the state was unable to effect a legitimate purpose by means of a lesser
burden on religion.58 The Braunfield plurality, however, did not de-
mand that the state's chosen means actually be the least restrictive
available. The regulation was permissible so long as the state could
reasonably have believed that the means it chose were necessary to
achieving its goal of "a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquil-
' See infra text accompanying notes 104-150.
5 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
66 Orthodox Jewish merchants challenged a Pennsylvania statute that proscribed
the Sunday retail sale of certain enumerated commodities. The merchants asserted that
the law would force them to choose between forsaking their Sabbath observance, a basic
tenet of their faith, or placing themselves at a severe economic disadvantage by closing
their stores for two days a week. Id. at 601-02.
57 Chief Justice Warren described the challenged law as "only an indirect burden
on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious
practice itself." Id. at 606. This analysis was based upon a belief/action distinction.
Compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship is strictly forbidden. The freedom to hold religious beliefs
and opinions is absolute. ...
However, the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions.
Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
6 [I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious obser-
vance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden.
Id. at 607.
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lity."5 9 Measured against this lenient standard, the Sunday closing law
was upheld.
The balance struck in Braunfeld, which tipped in favor of legiti-
mate government restrictions on free exercise, was altered in the next
major free exercise case to come before the Court, Sherbert v. Verner. °
In Sherbert, the Court found a free exercise violation in the application
of eligibility requirements for state unemployment compensation so as
to deny benefits to a sabbatarian because of her 'refusal to work on
Saturday."1 The Sherbert Court stated what has become the standard
free exercise test: infringements of free exercise are permissible only if
justified by a compelling state interest.62
5 Id. Custom dictated that Sunday continue to be the day set aside for relaxation.
Id. at 608 (citing the Court's discussion of alternatives to Sunday closing laws in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)). Although some states granted sabbatarians
exemptions from Sunday closing laws, the majority reasoned that Pennsylvania could
well have found that an exemption would undermine its goal of eliminating commercial
noise and activity for one day a week. Moreover, enforcement problems would accom-
pany an exemption system. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608.
The Braunfeld opinion, however, does not seem to follow its own rule. Allowing a
few stores to do business would hardly destroy the restful atmosphere of Sundays.
Moreover, the fact that other states with similar laws granted exemptions to sabbata-
rian merchants proves that less restrictive means were available. See id. at 614-15
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Rather than demanding that the challenged
ordinance be necessary to achieving the state interest, the Court in Braunfeld seemed to
engage in a balancing of interests. The admitted infringement of free exercise was eco-
nomic and indirect, whereas the state's purpose was an important one that could not
easily be achieved through alternative means.
60 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The majority opinion in Sherbert was written by Justice
Brennan, who had strongly dissented in Braunfeld. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610-16
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
6' Under the South Carolina unemployment compensation law, a claimant who
"failed, without good cause. . . to accept available suitable work when offered him by
the employment office or the employer" was ineligible for unemployment benefits. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 68-114(3) (1962) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(3)
(Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1983)). When a sabbatarian refused to accept work on
Saturday, she was disqualified for benefits. The situation was analogous to that of
Braunfeld-the act "simply regulate[d] a secular activity and, as applied to appellant[],
operate[d] so as to make the practice of [her] religious beliefs more expensive." Braun-
feld, 366 U.S. at 605. Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the challenged application of
the unemployment statute without overruling Braunfeld. Justice Stewart concurred
only in the result, in part because he believed that the distinctions drawn between
Sherbert and Braunfeld were specious; he thought that Braunfeld should have been
explicitly overruled. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in re-
sult); infra note 64.
62 If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to
withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because
her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the
State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental
burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a
"compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate. . . ." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 [19631.
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The requirement that a state demonstrate a compelling interest in
a challenged regulation is, of course, the most highly protective stan-
dard in the constitutional lexicon. The Sherbert Court observed that "in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion.' ,s Apparently rejecting the lower Braunfeld standard," the
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
The Sherbert opinion distinguished Braunfeld on the ground that the purposes
of the eligibility requirement could conceivably have been achieved through alternate
forms of regulation that would not burden first amendment rights. See Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 408-09. In Braunfeld, the Court noted, the statute that imposed a financial
burden on the free exercise of the appellants' religion was "nevertheless saved by a
countervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case-a strong state inter-
est in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers. . .[which] could be achieved
...only by declaring Sunday to be that day of rest." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408 (em-
phasis added).
Sherbert and Braunfeld are difficult to reconcile on the alternative means ground,
however, since granting exceptions to the eligibility provisions of unemployment com-
pensation laws would seem to produce no fewer administrative problems than granting
exceptions to Sunday closing laws.
Moreover, the two cases differ on the placement of the burden of proving the
efficacy or inefficacy of alternative means of achieving the state purpose. In Braunfeld,
the Court hypothesized that permitting exemptions might undermine the state's goal.
See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608 ("Thus, reason and experience teach that to permit the
exemption might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best possi-
ble, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity."). The burden in
Braunfeld thus seems to be placed on the challengers of the statute to prove that ex-
emptions would be feasible. See id. In Sherbert, on the other hand, the Court stated
that "it would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no
alternative forms of regulation would combat abuses without infringing First Amend-
ment rights." Id. at 407. No attempt was made to explain this departure from
Braunfeld.
Another distinction between the two cases was intimated by the Lakewood court
when it referred to the economic sanctions in Sherbert as "severe" and "life-threaten-
ing," Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983). The Lakewood court
apparently believed the financial burden created by disqualification for unemployment
benefits to be so oppressive as to compel a sabbatarian to disregard the tenets of her
religion. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his Sherbert concurrence, however, the im-
pact of the disqualification was in fact less onerous than that of the Sunday closing law,
for no criminal sanctions were involved, few sabbatarians had been unable to find suit-
able non-Saturday employment, and at the worst, the eligibility requirement would
deny a claimant a maximum of 22 weeks of compensation payments, whereas the Sun-
day closing law would force sabbatarian merchants to lose Saturday and Sunday profits
for their entire careers. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in
result).
Justice Stewart could not agree that Sherbert could stand consistently with Braun-
feld, a decision that he felt showed "a distressing insensitivity to the appropriate de-
mands of th[e] constitutional [free exercise] guarantee." Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring in result). Dissenting Justices Harlan and White likewise believed that Sherbert
necessarily overruled Braunfeld. One commentator has stated that "Sherbert was an
aberration when it was decided; it and Braunfeld ...are as irreconcilable as two
cases not involving the same parties can be." Ely, Legislative and Administrative Moti-
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Court emphasized that "no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice." 5
Subsequent free exercise cases followed the Sherbert approach.
Thus in Wisconsin v. Yoder66 the Court invalidated a compulsory
school attendance law as applied to Old Order Amish who believed that
they would endanger their own salvation and that of their children by
sending their children to high school.6 In Thomas v. Review Board of
the Indiana Employment Security Division,"8 the Court again found
that the denial of unemployment benefits (in this case, to a Jehovah's
Witness who resigned his job when he was transferred to a department
that manufactured equipment used by the military) violated religious
freedom.6"
The Sherbert test, as developed in Yoder and Thomas, requires
that a court first look to the burden on a citizen's ability freely to exer-
cise what has been variously termed a "fundamental tenet[] ' '70 or "car-
dinal principle"71 of her faith. The initial stage of the analysis, there-
fore, seemingly requires that a court evaluate the nature of the
burdened belief. Thomas, however, cautioned reviewing courts against
inquiring too deeply into the nature of the belief. Under Thomas, all
asserted beliefs are apparently protected except those that are "so bi-
zarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to pro-
tection under the Free Exercise Clause."
'7 2
Thomas, however, did not explicitly repudiate the "centrality" lan-
guage used in Sherbert and Yoder to describe the nature of the bur-
vation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1322 (1970).
e Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
e 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
67 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated:
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is
that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.
We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's in-
terest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the
exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
Id. at 215.
68 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
69 Id.
70 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
71 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
72 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. The Court granted constitutional protection to
Thomas's belief that the production of arms violated his religion even though other
Jehovah's Witnesses, including a fellow worker of Thomas's, found work on weapons
"scripturally" acceptable. For a commentary on Thomas and its application of the
Sherbert standard, see Note, Constitutional Law: The Religion Clauses-A Free Rein
to Free Exercise?, 11 STETSON L. REV. 386 (1982).
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dened belief.73 Nor did it reject the necessity that a court inquire into
the nature of the belief, although the Court admitted that such an in-
quiry "is more often than not a difficult and delicate task. ' 74 Thus the
Supreme Court has persistently suggested that free exercise analysis re-
quires some threshold assessment of the religious significance to the be-
liever of the burdened practice. Such suggestions may invite a court to
conclude, as did the Lakewood75 court, that the infringed practice does
not meet the level required to trigger the protective free exercise test.
The recent case of United States v. Lee18 illustrates an alternative
means of delimiting the scope of free exercise protection. In Lee, the
Court reiterated the Sherbert standard,7 but nevertheless found the as-
serted government'interest to be sufficiently important to justify the re-
striction. Lee claimed that the compulsory payment of social security
taxes violated the tenets of his Amish religion. Because the Amish be-
lieve that it is sinful not to provide for their own elderly, they are relig-
iously opposed to the national social security system. Although the
Court accepted Lee's contention that the compulsory payment of social
security taxes interfered with his religious freedom, it held that accom-
modating the Amish belief would unduly interfere with the integrity of
the social security system, in which the government had an "overrid-
ing" interest.78 The Court further found that the government's interest
could not be served through means less restrictive of Lee's belief.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in a concurring opinion, however, it
would have been relatively simple as an administrative matter to ex-
empt the Amish from social security taxes.7 9 Moreover, because the
7 The nature of the change wrought by Thomas on the "centrality" language is
not clear. While the majority articulated the "so bizarre" standard, it also spoke of
protected conduct as that which was "mandated by religious belief" and noted that
"[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause." 450 U.S.
at 718, 713.
7" Id. at 714.
75 Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lake-
wood, 699 F.2d 303, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
76 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
77 Id. at 257-58 ("The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by show-
ing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."). The use of
the word "overriding" rather than "compelling" may be significant, if it was intended
to signify a diminished burden placed on the government. The Court did not explain its
choice of language.
78 Id. at 257-60.
79 Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens, in fact, believed that the articu-
lated rationale for the free exercise cases did not explain the decisions or provide consis-
tent guidelines for future decisions. Justice Stevens stated in his Lee concurrence that
"a standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who ob-
jects to a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) better ex-
plains most of this Court's holdings than does the standard articulated by the Court
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Amish provide care for their aged, there would be no social cost to
eliminating their benefit payments-this elimination would more than
offset the revenue loss created by the exemption. The Lee Court thus
did not follow the strict standard it articulated. Indeed, although it cited
Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas, it reached a harsher result than
Braunfeld.
Lee's analysis served only further to confuse an already confusing
area of first amendment analysis. Lee, when compared with Sherbert
and Braunfeld, leaves a court with little guidance as to how compelling
a government interest must be in order to justify an infringement of
free exercise rights. Moreover, the Sherbert-Yoder-Thomas line of cases
has left unsettled the range of religiously motivated activity to which a
free exercise standard must be applied. It is clear that for the infringe-
ment of core religious beliefs, mandated by church doctrine, a high level
of justification is required. But for those religiously motivated activities
that a court considers to be nonfundamental, 0 or dictated merely by
personal predilection,"" or too indirectly or remotely infringed, 2 the
standard is unclear. For such activities, courts may invoke the free ex-
ercise cases to support a ruling that some religiously motivated activities
are simply unprotected by the free exercise clause.
Yet such a conclusion does not follow from free exercise prece-
dents. The Court has never directly addressed the question whether the
free exercise clause grants any protection to activity that is related to
religious observance but not actually demanded by religious doctrine or
dictated by the believer's conscience. Although the Court has spoken of
the centrality of the infringed religious belief, it has done so in the
context of determining whether the free exercise claim is legitimate:
whether, that is, the free exercise claim is based on religious belief
today." Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was forced to admit,
however, that the three major recent free exercise cases are at odds with his view of the
accepted standard. He called Yoder the "principal exception" to the standard he articu-
lated, and conceded that "[tihere is also tension between this standard and the reason-
ing of [Thomas] and [Sherbert]." Id. But he distinguished those cases, stating that
"[airguably . . .laws intended to provide a benefit to a limited class of otherwise dis-
advantaged persons should be judged by a different standard than that appropriate for
the enforcement of neutral laws of general applicability." Id.
Lee can be explained by Justice Stevens's proposed standard. Other explanations,
however, are equally plausible. One explanation for the Lee decision is that the Court
has particular solicitude for the social security system. Another is that the Court had
become wary of establishment clause problems raised by rigorous application of the
compelling interest test. Thus, if Lee does nothing more, it points to the urgent need to
clarify the Court's current approach to religious claims.
80 See Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
Si See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
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rather than philosophical predilection and whether the claim of reli-
gious motivation is fraudulent.83 The unsettled question of the appro-
priate standard for religiously motivated (as opposed to religiously de-
manded) activity makes it important that the Supreme Court consider
such a case as Lakewood.
III. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION OF THE CHURCH
ZONING PROBLEM
A. Granting Protection to Non-Central Activities
The first step" toward determining the appropriate standard of re-
view in church zoning cases is to recognize, as the court in Lakewood,
Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood84
did not, that zoning laws excluding churches from residential areas in-
fringe religious freedom. Zoning ordinances do not, of course, force be-
lievers to act against their consciences-no creed dictates that a church
building be located in a certain neighborhood. Thus, if a court in a
church zoning case applies a standard of review that depends for its
stringency on the centrality of the restricted practice to religious doc-
trine,85 the court will necessarily reject the free exercise claim before it.
Such a standard, however, is inappropriate in church zoning cases,
which present a special kind of free exercise claim: zoning ordinances
force members of churches not to violate the teachings of their faith, but
rather to alter the exercise of its ritualistic elements.
Regulation of the location of churches thus can be seen as regula-
tion of religious expression, not religious belief. These two aspects of
faith, of course, are not entirely distinct, discrete forms.88 Ritual, an
expressive element of religious belief, 7 is in some religions inseparable
83 See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 72 (1983).
85 See id. at 305. The Lakewood court relied on language drawn from Supreme
Court cases focusing on the fundamental nature of the religious observances at issue.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) ("The conclusion is ines-
capable that secondary schooling. . . contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice
of the Amish faith . . . ."); see also supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
86 See E. UNDERHILL, WORSHIP 25 (1937) ("[Ilt is not really possible for human
creatures to set up a watertight compartment between visible and invisible, outward
and inward worship."). Relegation of the role of religion to a system of belief would
ignore the behavioral elements of religion and lead to secularization. See Note, Reli-
gious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities,
90 YALE, L.J. 350, 364 (1980).
87 See, e.g., P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 117 (1957) ("The community of
faith constitutes itself through ritual symbol."; E. UNDERHILL, supra note 86, at 13-14
("[Wiorship is given its concrete expression in institutions and in ritual acts: and these
institutions and acts become in their turn powerful instruments, whereby the worship-
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from the spiritual experience of faith."8 Even for religious groups that
place less emphasis on ritual, the assembly of a community of believers
is an integral part of religion."9 The periodic reaffirmance of belief in
an assembly of fellow believers reinforces the members' commitment to
their individual faith. A religious group is more than the sum of its
individual believers: the assembly of its members is essential to the cre-
ation of a unified community with a shared spiritual life and common
goals.90 The assembly of the members of the church serves not only to
create a sense of community among the members themselves through
the shared expression of common beliefs, but also to communicate to
outsiders the church's identity as a group committed to a common
ideal.9"
An individual's participation in group worship may serve not only
to communicate her views within and without the group, but also as a
form of self-expression, important to the inward self. Worship accord-
ing to a given ritual has a psychological significance for believers, pro-
viding them with support and a sense of historical continuity with past
participants in the same rituals.92 The spiritual and aesthetic experi-
ence that religious ritual offers contributes to the inner life of many
ping temper is taught, stimulated, and maintained.").
I' See, e.g., E. UNDERHILL, supra note 86, at 22 ("[The most characteristic
means of human worship are . . .the agreed symbols, and the established formulas
and rites, which make concerted religious action and even concerted religious emotion
possible."). For sociological commentary on the significance of religious rituals among
various cultures, see generally E. DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RE-
LIGIOUS LIFE (J.W. Swain trans. 1915).
89 See, e.g., J.E. SMITH, EXPERIENCE AND GOD 159-60 (1968) ("The community
provides the medium whereby experience passes beyond individual form and becomes
more sharply defined in terms of generic and repeatable features."); P. TILLICH, supra
note 87, at 24 ("The religious language, the language of symbol and myth, is created in
the community of believers and cannot be fully understood outside this community.").
90 See, e.g., J.E. SMITH, supra note 89, at 158-60 (community built on common
faith, hopes, and tasks creates a "transindividual unity of experience"); E. UNDERHILL,
supra note 86, at 21 (the creation of rituals in which "all the members of [the] group
can be united in common action towards God" provides a good "model for human
worship"); Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MicH.
L. REV. 679, 695 (1969) ("Ceremony and ritual are the chief mechanisms by which the
group defines itself in terms of action as opposed to pure doctrine."). For an exposition
of the theory that the sacred elements of ritual and belief are in fact the embodiment of
the norms of the group; see generally E. DURKHEIM, supra note 88.
91 See Dodge, supra note 90, at 697-98 ("[W]orship is the primary outlet for
expressing one's religious commitment publicly in collective ceremony and prayer.").
For recognition that religion has social and institutional as well as individual signifi-
cance, see Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1274,
1284-91 (1961).
92 See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, supra note 88, at 371 ("Men celebrate [ritual] to re-
main faithful to the past."); E. UNDERHILL, supra note 86, at 35 (ritual is "one of the
chief means by which the historical character of worship is preserved and carried for-
ward, and permanence given to the devotional discoveries of men").
[Vol. 132:1131
EXPANDED FREE EXERCISE PROTECTION
individuals.93 The sense of community created by group worship is a
factor in many persons' sense of self.9 ' Moreover, the very decision to
be a member of a religious group, and to publicize that decision by
attending religious services, may serve as a statement to the world of
the way in which the believer chooses to be identified.95 As one com-
mentator has observed, "freedom to have impact on others-to make
the 'statement' implicit in a public identity-is central to any adequate
conception of the self."9
It is clear that the location of a church building may have consid-
erable significance for the expressive component of religious observance.
The aesthetic characteristics of a church structure and its surroundings
influence the activities held within it. The Supreme Court has recently
alluded to the importance of peaceful surroundings for religious build-
ings. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. , it acknowledged that
"churches have a valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of
commercial establishment."98 Moreover, a zoning ordinance that ex-
cludes churches from residential neighborhoods burdens religious exer-
cise insofar as members of a religious organization are less able to at-
tend churches at an inconvenient distance from their homes. Excluding
churches from residential districts would cause particular problems for
the elderly and other less mobile persons, to whom religious services are
often of special importance. A religious group's freedom to build a
church in the neighborhood of its choice is thus an important dimension
of the right to self-expression inherent in religious freedom.
Although worship in a church building may not constitute commu-
nication or self-expression in precisely the same sense as does speech-
making or distribution of pamphlets, it has sufficient characteristics in
'1 See E. UNDERHILL, supra note 86, at 14, 28 (ritual may exert "a stabilizing
influence at every level of [the individual's] religious life"; it may "evoke, deepen, and
maintain that obscure sense of God which is the raw material of worship").
", The believer "leaves his isolation, approaches others and seeks to convince
them, and it is the ardour of the convictions which he arouses that strengthens his
own." E. DURKHEIM, supra note 88, at 425. An argument might thus be made that
religiously motivated activity deserves some protection under the constitutional right of
privacy and personhood. The privacy aspects of religious freedom have long been recog-
nized. Thus, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court stated that the
liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment included the "right of the individual
. . . to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience." Id. at 399 (1922)
(dictum). The articulation of such a rationale for heightened protection of religiously
motivated activity is beyond the scope of this Comment, which seeks only to broaden
protection for such activity within more established lines of free exercise analysis.
" See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
98 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 888 (1978).
97 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982) (invalidating state statute allowing church to block cer-
tain liquor license applications).
98 Id. at 509.
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common with those communicative and expressive activities to which
the Court has extended first amendment protection to support a plausi-
ble claim for similar protection.99 It is thus logical to apply free speech
decisions to church zoning cases by analogy. The Supreme Court has in
fact recognized the correspondence between religious and secular com-
munication and has analyzed several cases involving the free expression
of religious beliefs as free speech cases.x00 Recently, for example, the
Court applied a least restrictive alternative analysis drawn from "time,
place, and manner" precedents to hold that a provision regulating the
distribution of literature at a state fair was a permissible restriction on
the place and manner of communicating the views of the Krishna
religion.101
Given the elements of communication and self-expression inherent
in religious worship and the effect that location of the church structure
has on the experience of worship, a religious group's decision as to the
location of its church should be granted first amendment protection.
Because the location of a church is not normally dictated by religious
belief, however, this aspect of religious freedom may not merit the
stringent standard articulated in Sherbert v. Verner,0 2 which requires
the government to prove a compelling interest in its zoning ordinance.
B. Adopting an Intermediate Standard of Review
Lakewood serves to illustrate the consequences of demanding a
compelling government interest to justify an infringement upon a pro-
tected freedom. Courts are hesitant to impose such a heavy burden of
justification on the government unless the challenged law imposes an
obvious burden on a protected freedom. If a court finds that a zoning
" See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (wearing of armbands is orderly expression of opinion and therefore protected
speech). For the suggestion that a zoning ordinance barring houses of worship from an
entire municipality would be as clearly unconstitutional as an ordinance barring reli-
gious meetings or leaflet distribution from all streets of a town, see L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDoM 564-65 (1953).
10 See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981), discussed infra notes 123-134 and accompanying text; see also Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (applying time, place, and manner analysis to
parades or processions of Jehovah's Witnesses on public streets); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying prior restraint analysis to proselytizing by Jeho-
vah's Witnesses); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (applying least restrictive
alternative analysis to restrictions on door-to-door distribution of religious circulars);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (treating distribution of literature by Jehovah's
Witnesses as liberty of the press).
101 Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981).
102 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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law does not implicate first amendment rights at all, however, then the
law will be valid, under the standard articulated in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,103 unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasona-
ble-that is, it will almost always be valid.
A better solution would be to acknowledge that zoning ordinances
can affect religious freedom and to subject them to an analysis that
explicitly confronts the first amendment interests at stake. Because zon-
ing regulations do not prohibit belief or outlaw behavior that is central
to any faith, the government should not have to prove a compelling
interest to justify a zoning ordinance. Rather, the analysis appropriate
for a neutral government act, like a zoning ordinance, that restricts reli-
gious expression should be the same as for neutral government acts that
circumscribe secular expression. That analysis, well-established as ap-
plied to ordinances regulating the time, place, and manner of a person's
speech, requires that the government justify every such regulation by
proving not only that it serves an important government purpose, but
also that the purpose could not be accomplished by a means less restric-
tive of expressive freedom.
1. Neutral Restrictions Upon Expressive Activity:
Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis
The Court has long recognized that the state may regulate expres-
sive activity as long as the regulation does not violate fundamental first
amendment values. Thus even in "public forums" the state may place
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner in which pro-
tected speech is carried on.'" A municipality, for example, may regu-
late the times of parades,'0 5 the location of theaters,'"6 or the volume of
loudspeakers on sound trucks.
107
103 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme
Court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance against a claim that it violated a land-
owner's property rights. The Court held that such regulation was within the police
power of a state and was legitimate if its provisions were not "dearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare." Id. at 395. Moreover the Court said that "[i]f the validity of the legisla-
tive classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control." Id. at 388. The Euclid Court was careful to note, however, that
its holding supported only the facial validity of the zoning ordinance, and not the appli-
cation of any particular provision. Id. at 395. Indeed, the Court explicitly noted that its
holding did not extend to the possible effects of the ordinance on churches. Id. at 385.
104 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 96, at 688-89.
105 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
10" Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
107 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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In evaluating the constitutionality of such regulations, the Court
begins by recognizing that because first amendment interests are in-
volved, courts must elevate their level of scrutiny. As the Court ob-
served in Grayned v. City of Rockford, °8 "[O]ur cases make clear that
in assessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh heavily
the fact that communication is involved"; the regulation therefore
"must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest."1 °
Accordingly, the Court mandates a four-step inquiry in time,
place, and manner cases. First, a court must determine whether the
challenged regulation does indeed infringe first amendment interests. If
it does, then the court must inquire whether the ordinance is content
neutral. If the challenged regulation is not neutral-if, for example,
only Democrats are allowed to speak in a park-then it is invalid. 10 If
the regulation is content neutral, however, the court proceeds to the
next step and inquires into the nature of the government interest at
stake. The Court has characterized the level to which this interest must
rise in various ways; it must be "significant," or "important and sub-
stantial."""1 A wide variety of interests have been held to be of suffi-
cient importance to meet this standard.1 2 In particular, interests in re-
ducing congestion or in preserving the character of neighborhoods, the
government interests most often asserted in zoning cases, rise to the
required level.1"'
IL8 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
109 Id. at 116-17.
110 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) ("[J]ustifications
for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized."); cf. Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (rule prohibiting
inclusion in monthly bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy not a
valid time, place, and manner restriction because based on the content of the insert);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (regulation prohibiting nudity
at drive-in movie not a valid time, place, and manner restriction because based on the
content of the films).
111 Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
I See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981) (state interest in crowd control at a state fair sufficient to limit reli-
gious group's ability to sell and distribute literature); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972) (state interest in preventing disruption of school sessions of sufficient
importance to limit picketing activity); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(state's substantial interest in controlling movement on streets and highways sufficient
to enable state to limit parade permits); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (state
interest in reducing litter sufficient to justify some reduction of leafletting, although a
total ban on leafletting is not permissible).
11 See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 75 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (valid state interest in preventing deterioration of commer-
cial neighborhoods); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (valid state
interest in noise and motor vehicle traffic).
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Having shown both that a regulation is content neutral and that
an important government interest is at stake, the state bears a final
burden of proving that its chosen means burden expressive rights in the
least restrictive way possible."1 4 As part of this inquiry, a court may
look to the availability of alternative forums for the protected activ-
ity. 5 At this stage, most total bans of expressive activity will fail be-
cause they are unlikely to be the least restrictive means available to the
government and because an alternative forum is, by definition, unavail-
able when a ban is total.116
The Court has mandated that the least restrictive alternative anal-
ysis be applied to a wide variety of expressive activities. For example,
cases involving commercial speech 1 or expressive conduct 1 ' require a
least restrictive alternative analysis. Moreover, the Court has applied
the analysis to determine whether zoning ordinances that restrict secu-
lar expressive activity are constitutional. In Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.119 and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,2 ° the
Court faced challenges to ordinances that excluded entertainment from
certain parts of town.1 21 In both cases, the Court acknowledged that the
114 Most regulations that do not withstand least restrictive alternative analysis fail
because the state cannot make this showing. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (restriction on charitable solicitation
based on the percentage of funds used for charitable purposes not the least restrictive
means of promoting state interest in preventing fraud); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (restriction on distribution of leaflets not the least restrictive means of promoting
state interest in controlling litter).
5 The inquiry into the availability of alternative forums is sometimes presented
as a separate part of the analysis. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981). It is unclear, however, whether the
Court would ever invalidate, because there were no alternative forums, a regulation
that was the state's least restrictive option. For example, in Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), only after deciding that the state had not chosen the least
restrictive alternative did the Court find there to be no evidence that live entertainment,
the prohibited activity, was available in nearby areas. Id. at 76.
116 See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (invalidating regulation partly because it completely prevented dissemination of
information). The availability of an alternative forum, however, does not in itself justify
the state's restriction. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("one is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place").
117 See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
118 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
119 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
120 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
121 In Young, the Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld zoning ordinances requir-
ing that adult movie theaters be dispersed, rather than concentrated in one neighbor-
hood. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the ordinances did not impose a
limit on the total number of adult theaters which were allowed to operate in Detroit.
Justice Stevens noted the district court's finding that there were "myriad locations"
1984]
1156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
challenged ordinance limited protected expression. It did not subject the
ordinances to the stringent scrutiny triggered by government regulation
of the content of protected speech, however. Rather, it recognized that
restriction of the location of theaters was a time, place, and manner
regulation and therefore required the same analysis as cases involving
the regulation of parades or the use of loudspeakers.' 22
The appropriateness of the least restrictive alternative analysis as
applied to religiously motivated activity is demonstrated by the recent
case of Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. 2 ' [ISKCON], in which the Court felt compelled to deny the very
real free exercise issues inherent in the case in order to apply what the
majority considered to be the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny
to the challenged regulation. The petitioners in Heffron, practitioners
of the Krishna religion, claimed the right to pass freely among fairgoers
at the Minnesota State Fair to distribute literature and to solicit funds
for their church. The petitioners maintained that this activity, called
"Sankirtan," was a ritual of their faith. The fair authorities, however,
ruled that such activity was subject to the restriction that the sale or
distribution of merchandise must be confined to fixed locations on the
fairgrounds. 24
The majority analyzed the case not as a free exercise case but
rather as a free expression case. The Court focused on ISKCON's free
speech right to sell and distribute its literature, which it shared equally
with all secular groups, rather than its free exercise right, which might
have distinguished its claim. This threshold focus determined the analy-
sis to be applied. Thus the Court ruled that the protected sale and
distribution activities of ISKCON, "like those of others protected by the
First Amendment, are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions."' 25 It then proceeded to analyze ISKCON's claim by ap-
plying the least restrictive alternative analysis.
within the city of Detroit where adult theaters could be located. Young, 427 U.S. at 71
n.35. This fact distinguishes Young from Schad, in which the Court invalidated an
ordinance excluding all live entertainment from a municipality. Another difference be-
tween the cases is that in Young the city presented evidence that the concentration of
adult movie theaters led to deterioration of the surrounding neighborhoods, whereas
Mount Ephraim failed similarly to justify its exclusion of live entertainment in Schad.
The greater burden placed upon communicative activity with less justification led the
Schad Court to hold the Mount Ephraim ordinance unconstitutional.
1" In Young, the time, place, and manner analysis was applied by Justice Powell,
whose opinion concurred only in the judgment and was necessary to the result. See
Young, 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring). In Schad, the majority explicitly ap-
plied the analysis. 452 U.S. at 67-77 (1981).
123 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
124 Id. at 643.
125 Id. at 647.
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Having found the necessary infringement of a protected expressive
right, the Court next found that the challenged regulation was content
neutral, because it applied evenhandedly to the distribution and sale of
merchandise by any group.12 The Court then found that the restriction
served the state's significant interest in maintaining order and control-
ling crowds at the fair.127 Finally, the Court concluded that the state
had no less restrictive means of accomplishing this objective than by
limiting the sales and distributive activity of all groups to booths rented
for the purpose. This finding depended upon the threshold determina-
tion that ISKCON's protected rights did not differ from those of any
secular group; the fair authorities, therefore, could not grant an excep-
tion to ISKCON without doing so for every secular group. Such whole-
sale permission of sales and distributive activity throughout the fair-
grounds would defeat the state's interest in order and crowd control.'28
The Court's choice of a free expression analysis enabled it to avoid
imposing the exceedingly high burden of justification on the state ap-
parently required by the free exercise cases; it was thereby able to give
due recognition to the important state interests at stake. But the Court
reached this result only by ignoring (at best) or demeaning (at worst)
the free exercise issues presented .' 2  The majority explained its choice
only at tht end of its analysis. "None of our cases," it said, "suggest
that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual
entitles church members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior
to those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do
not purport to ritualize the process."' 3 ° The majority believed, in short,
that no particular free exercise problem was presented.
Justice Brennan, in partial concurrence, was "somewhat puzzled
by the Court's treatment of the Sankirtan issue."'' He was especially
troubled by the way in which the Court "disparages the significance of
this ritual . . . without explanation or supporting authority."' 3 2 Bren-
nan believed that a case in which "governmental regulations . . . inter-
126 Id. at 648-49.
127 Id. at 650-51.
128 The Court in Heffron looked finally to the availability of alternative forums
for the protected activity and found that the restriction applied only to the fairground,
and that even within the fairground there was no ban on the activity but simply a
requirement that it take place in a specified location. Id. at 654-55.
129 One explanation of the Court's treatment of the free exercise issue is that the
petitioners, although they alleged that the regulation violated both the free speech and
the free exercise clauses, expressed in brief and oral argument a willingness "to rest
their challenges wholly upon their general right to free speech." Id. at 65 n.3 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120 Id. at 652.
111 Id. at 659 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132 Id.
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fere[d] with the exercise of specific religious beliefs or principles"
should be scrutinized "with particular care."13 Although he did not
explicitly specify the analysis he believed appropriate, he suggested
strongly that the proper solution would be to apply, by analogy, the
least restrictive alternative analysis of the time, place, and manner
cases. 2
3 4
2. Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis Applied to Free Exercise
Claims: The Case of Church Zoning Ordinances
The least restrictive alternative analysis would provide a princi-
pled way for courts explicitly to recognize the free exercise issues posed
by religiously motivated activity while allowing states to restrict such
activity when necessary.
In assessing free exercise challenges to zoning ordinances, a court
should first inquire whether a protected right has been infringed.13 5 As
a general rule, zoning ordinances that affect churches infringe free ex-
ercise rights because of the communicative value of ritual and the im-
portance of group religious activity. 36
Having assessed the burden upon a protected right, a court should
next scrutinize the asserted government interest in the exclusion.13 7 In-
123 Id.
134 Id.
"" In Schad, the Court indicated that the solution proposed in this Comment was
consistent with its previous treatment of zoning variances:
[T]he zoning power is not infinite and unchallengeable; it "must be exer-
cised within constitutional limits." Accordingly, it is subject to judicial re-
view; and, as is most often the case, the standard of review is determined
by the nature of the right assertedly threatened or violated....
[W]hen a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be nar-
rowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government
interest.
452 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted).
1386 See supra text accompanying notes 84-101.
137 The second step of the analysis requires that an ordinance be content neutral.
This step is almost superfluous within the context of the free exercise clause, because
any government regulation that favored one sect or disfavored another would be void
under the establishment clause, regardless of any free exercise invalidity.
Any special exemption of religious activities from government regulation raises an
establishment problem. The Supreme Court has recognized that if either the free exer-
cise or the establishment clause were to be "expanded to a logical extreme, [each]
would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69
(1970). Rather than adopting a single theory to resolve the clash between the clauses,
however, the Court has relied upon a case-by-case resolution of problems. The tension
between the establishment and free exercise clauses has been the subject of much schol-
arly comment. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962); L. TRIBE,
supra note 96, at 812-85; Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turn-
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terests that historically have served to legitimate zoning ordi-
nances-control of traffic congestion and building density and aesthetic
considerations-rise to the required level in this context."' 8
It is at the last step of the analysis, which requires the government
to show that it has chosen the least restrictive means of accomplishing
its legitimate goals, that the greatest changes from present practice
would occur. For example, blanket exclusions of churches from residen-
tial neighborhoods would almost never be validated under this step of
the analysis, because there are almost always less restrictive means of
accomplishing such legitimate aims as controlling traffic congestion.1 9
Less comprehensive restrictions, such as limits on the size of church
buildings or the number of churches in any particular area, might well
survive scrutiny depending on the facts of a particular case.' 4 °
The broadening of free exercise analysis by adopting a least re-
strictive alternative analysis for religiously motivated activity has sev-
eral advantages over the due process analysis to which such claims are
now often relegated. First, the approach provides a higher level of judi-
cial protection, appropriate to the religious interests involved, than does
the due process analysis.141 The burden of proof is shifted definitively
ing Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 513 (1968); Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of
the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561 (1980); Comment, A Non-Conflict Ap-
proach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L. Rv. 1175 (1983).
"3 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
139 For example, the state could require increased parking facilities or install traf-
fic lights. The Court in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), invalidated a restric-
tion on leafletting, which the state defended as an antilitter measure, because the state
could always enforce its litter laws against those who actually litter.
Thus, for example, the ordinance in Lakewood, which excluded churches from
90% of the city and which allowed churches to be built only in commercial and high
density districts, would not survive least restrictive alternative analysis because the as-
serted interests in traffic regulation and the aesthetic character of the neighborhood
could certainly be accomplished by less restrictive means. The Jehovah's Witnesses, in
fact, proposed such alternatives when they applied for their zoning variance. Their
planned parking lot, they asserted, would control the problem of traffic congestion.
Kingdom Hall was designed to blend in with the architecture in the area. Trees on the
property were to be preserved and the parking lot sheltered from nearby homes. These
features would mitigate any potential decrease in property values and help to preserve
the neighborhood's aesthetic integrity.
140 Such solutions might not suffice if, for example, the city were to prove that the
church wished to build a modern structure in a historic preservation district, or if the
religious group proposed to tear down an existing structure of architectural value. The
Lakewood area in which the Jehovah's Witnesses planned to build did, in fact, consist
of stately, turn-of-the-century homes, although it had not been historically certified. On
a similar set of facts, a municipality might be able to prove that the legitimate goal of
preserving the aesthetic character of a neighborhood could not be achieved by a means
less restrictive than excluding all modern structures from the district.
141 See supra text accompanying note 24.
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to the government once the initial infringement is recognized. More-
over, there are several steps at which the government may fail to carry
its burden: it may fail to demonstrate that the ordinance is a neutral
one; it may fail to demonstrate that its interests are sufficiently substan-
tial; or it may fail to demonstrate that its chosen means are least bur-
densome on protected activity.
1 42
Second, the least restrictive alternative inquiry, like the due pro-
cess analysis, provides a flexibility that enables a government to justify
its regulation by demonstrating, upon the particular facts of the case,
that the ordinance is the least restrictive possible. For example, a mu-
nicipality may well be able to demonstrate that the construction of a
particular church would be unsuitable to a residential area because it
would be "basically incompatible with the normal" residential use.
14 3
The analysis has the third advantage of enabling a court explicitly
to recognize the religious interests involved without inquiring into the
nature of the religious interests. A court need not decide that an as-
serted interest is "fundamental," ' 44 "cardinal, ''141 or even not "bi-
zarre"146 in order to apply the analysis. All it must do is accept the
plaintiff's sincere assertion that the activity restricted by a state regula-
tion is religiously motivated. This removes judicial temptation to shop
for the appropriate analysis by categorizing the nature of the religious
interest involved.
14 7
142 See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 71 (1981) ("Because the ordinance challenged in
this case significantly limits communicative activity within the Borough, we must scru-
tinize both the interest advanced by the Borough to justify this limitation on protected
expression and the means chosen to further those interests.").
14' Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). In Lakewood, for
example, the city might well have proved that the decrease in the value of the sur-
rounding properties would be substantial if the congregation erected its church. Cars,
the plan showed, were to be parked within six feet of an adjacent home along its entire
depth. The proposed buildings, parking spaces, drives, and sidewalks would occupy
70% of the congregation's lot as opposed to 40% occupied by residential uses. Kingdom
Hall would also draw a substantial crowd into the otherwise quiet district at least three
times a week. Thus, the city might well have been able to show, on the Grayned "in-
compatibility" test for the reasonableness of a time, place, and manner restriction, that
the congregation's church would have been "incompatible" with the "normal" residen-
tial use patterns of the neighborhood.
144 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
145 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
148 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715
(1981).
147 Such categorization may have figured in the Lakewood decision. One wonders
if the Lakewood zoning authority would have treated Episcopalians as it did the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, or whether in that case a court would have similarly upheld the
board's decision. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (ordinance
struck down because it gave state official unbridled discretion to determine whether a
cause was religious and thus whether its proponents could obtain a permit to solicit
contributions); see also Heffron, 452 U.S. at 659 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
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Fourth, and perhaps most important, the approach eschews the ad
hoc balancing process engaged in by the state courts. While such an
approach may sometimes arrive at appropriate results, 4 8 it does so only
inconsistently, and at the price of obscuring the relative weights the
court has assigned to competing religious and secular interests.
The distinction between the balancing analysis and the least re-
strictive alternative analysis proposed here may be illustrated by refer-
ence to Heffron.149 Once the Heffron majority determined that a first
amendment right was infringed, it engaged in no further scrutiny of the
nature or quality of that interest. As Justice Brennan noted in partial
concurrence, "once a governmental regulation is shown to impinge
upon basic First Amendment rights, the burden falls on the government
to show the validity of its asserted interest and the absence of less intru-
sive alternatives. ' 150 Thus, once infringement of a protected right is
established, the state must prove that its chosen means are the least
intrusive possible; it may not seek, at this stage of the analysis, to have
a court balance the state's asserted interest against the importance of
the infringed right. A least restrictive alternative analysis, therefore,
while giving the state ample opportunity to choose means sufficient to
accomplish legitimate ends, nevertheless confines the state to the use of
those means most narrowly tailored to meet its objectives. Such an ap-
proach leaves judges free to appraise the appropriateness of the govern-
ment's means, an analysis courts have the institutional competence to
make, but removes the temptation to assess the importance or centrality
of religious expression, an inquiry that should not be confided to the
discretion of any public official.
CONCLUSION
Interferences with practices required by conscience or by religious
dogma constitute the clearest and most severe infringements of religious
freedom. To limit first amendment protection to such extreme infringe-
ments, however, would be to interpret the free exercise clause overly
narrowly. Many practices not dictated by church doctrine are nonethe-
less significant incidents of religious observance, integrally related to
and dissenting in part) (condemning the "disparagement" of one faith's ritual, because
other major faiths did not similarly ritualize the same activity). It is important to re-
member that religious motivation, even within the established faiths, may lead to the
ritualization of certain types of behavior at which judges, who do not share the motiva-
tion, might look askance. The Court, in Thomas, recognized the dangers of such judi-
cial categorization of religious activity. See 450 U.S. at 713-16.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 31-46.
149 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
150 Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the right freely to exercise one's religion.
In the construction of a house of worship, secular and religious
elements are mingled. To characterize such construction as a purely
secular act is to overlook the connection between the physical structure
and the ritual carried on within it. The act of worship is central to
religious life. It is, moreover, an important idiom in which believers
convey their religious beliefs to each other and to the outside world.
The location and physical characteristics of a church building vitally
affect the exercise of this form of expression.
Most state courts have not handled church zoning cases under the
free exercise clause. Instead, they have found ordinances excluding
churches from residential districts to violate the due process clause. A
reading of the opinions reveals that these courts are in fact employing a
heightened due process scrutiny that takes burdens on religious freedom
into account. Reliance on due process analysis, however, has led to an
absence of principled criteria for assessing burdens on free exercise.
Church zoning cases should rather be handled under the free exercise
clause, so that the religious interests at stake can be explicitly
addressed.
The currently articulated free exercise standard requires that a
burden on the free exercise of religion be justified by a compelling gov-
ernment interest. This standard was developed in cases involving inter-
ference with religiously mandated practices. When the burdened activ-
ity is not dictated by a fundamental tenet of the faith, the government
should not have to sustain so heavy a burden of justification. Rather, it
should be required only to prove that its chosen means for accomplish-
ing its legitimate purposes are the least restrictive of religious interests.
Because the Supreme Court has never dealt with a claim that the free
exercise clause protects against burdens on religiously motivated activity
that is not doctrinally required, it has left lower courts free to adopt the
Sixth Circuit's all-or-nothing approach. Recognition of a free exercise
claim in a church zoning case could provide needed guidance as to the
proper analysis to be applied to government acts that interfere with
religiously motivated activity.
